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Fight or Flight: The Ninth Circuit’s
Advancement of Textualism
During an Era of Intentionalism
in United States v. Lozoya
Abstract
The modern complexities of global interaction and accessibility
have recently forced some federal courts to reconsider standards for
determining proper venue for criminal defendants who commit
offenses while engaged in transportation, particularly those
involving interstate commerce and crimes spanning multiple
districts. These courts’ application of two adversarial schools of
statutory interpretation—textualism and intentionalism—has driven
conflict between textualist jurisdictions adhering to the plain
meaning of established constitutional and statutory sources, and
intentionalist jurisdictions refraining from the “creeping absurdity”
of establishing venue for certain in-transit offenses under the literal
meaning of such provisions.
This Note endorses the sensibility and superiority of the Ninth
Circuit’s textualist approach to statutory interpretation in
determining the proper venue for an in-flight assault in United
States v. Lozoya. Specifically, this Note covers the significance of
the Lozoya decision in exercising statutory interpretation that was
faithful to well-settled traditions of venue law without heeding to the
accessible but superficial understanding of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) that
recently guided other federal circuit courts.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent adjudication concerning the proper jurisdiction for in-flight
criminal offenses has taken a permissive approach in authorizing venue, often
causing venue to land outside of the scope of well-established constitutional
and federal sources.1 As a central tenet of our republican system, venue
primarily pertains to the district where a crime may be brought to trial so as
to protect the defendant from a trial in a district inconvenient or unfair to him. 2
Broad readings of statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3238,
while interpreted in the pursuit of justice,3 have given effect to venue in any
number of districts traversed during the course of the flight and the district in
which the plane lands. Under circumstances such as those confronted in
United States v. Lozoya, the Ninth Circuit recognized that such broad statutory
interpretation dilutes the plain meaning of these statutes and undermines
respected “notions of justice” rooted in practiced constitutional and federal
venue provisions.4
In Lozoya, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with the challenge of
determining where the proper venue should be for the trial of a defendant
charged with an assault that occurred during a flight from Minneapolis to Los
Angeles.5 The court took a contrasting approach to interpret 18 U.S.C.
§ 3237(a) and addressed how linchpin clauses, such as offenses “involving the
use of . . . transportation in interstate commerce” and “continuing offense[s],”
were intended to operate by their plain meaning.6 Both Judge Smith’s
majority opinion and Judge Owens’s dissent contemplated whether the court’s
holding aligned with the absurdity doctrine, which instructs courts that
statutes “should be interpreted to avoid absurd results, unless a contrary
1. See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that venue was
proper for crimes committed on an airplane in the district where the airplane lands); United States v.
Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding that venue was proper for crimes committed on
an airplane in any district through which the plane travels during the flight).
2. See Megan O’Neill, Comment, Extra Venues for Extraterritorial Crimes? 18 U.S.C. § 3238
and Cross-Border Criminal Activity, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1425, 1448 (2013).
3. See United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 349–350 (11th Cir. 1982) (“We construe any
violation of this statute which occurs on some form of transportation in interstate or foreign commerce
to be a ‘continuing violation’ under 18 U.S.C. § 3237[.] . . . [The statute] is a catchall provision
designed to prevent a crime which has been committed in transit from escaping punishment for lack
of venue.”).
4. See Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd
Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 146 (1994).
5. United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 2019).
6. Id. at 1239–40.
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outcome was fully anticipated and clearly manifested by the statutory
language or its legislative history.”7
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit reached the correct holding in
Lozoya in comparison to recent decisions concerning venue decided by the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits which allowed speculative congressional intent
to take precedence over the plain meaning of pivotal statutory provisions.
While the meaning of key clauses in § 3237(a) is not “plain” in the sense that
it can be ascertained without effort, the effort given by the Ninth Circuit in
Lozoya was necessary in order to buck the trend of allowing flawed catchall
statutory interpretation to unjustly expand the grasp of venue determinations
under circumstances that are already properly addressed by constitutional
norms.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF VENUE AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
The Sixth Amendment of our Constitution laid the foundation for venue
as a principle designed to protect a criminal defendant’s right to a fair and
impartial trial, stating that the defendant must be prosecuted in “the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”8 In recent years, the
plain meaning of this fundamental concept has been unnecessarily
complicated by courts seeking to determine the proper venue for crimes
committed during airplane flights.9
Modern complexities of global
accessibility have forced some courts to reconsider standards for providing
venue to criminal defendants charged with committing offenses while
engaged in transportation, particularly transportation that involves interstate
commerce and spans multiple districts.10 Courts have focused on two federal
statutes—18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3238—in deciding venue for
criminal offenses involving interstate transportation and crimes spanning
multiple districts.
18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) states that:

7. Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1006 (2006).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also FED R. CRIM. P. 18 (stating that “[u]nless a statute or these
rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was
committed.”).
9. See Breitweiser v. United States, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cope,
676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012).
10. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 30 (quoting S. REP. NO. 87-694, at 2–3 (1961)).
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Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress,
any offense against the United States begun in one district and
completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be
inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense was
begun, continued, or completed.
Any offense involving use of the mails, or transportation in interstate
or foreign commerce, is a continuing offense and, except as otherwise
expressly provided by enactment of Congress, may be inquired of and
prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which such
commerce or mail matter moves.11
Meanwhile, 18 U.S.C. § 3238 states that “[t]he trial of all offenses begun
or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any
particular State or district, shall be in the district in which the offender, or any
one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is first brought . . . .”12
While the statutes themselves present no conflict of law, the federal
court’s application of two adversarial traditions of statutory interpretation
have created absurd results under certain circumstances, which has given rise
some to jurisdictional concerns. The first school of thought, intentionalism,
is premised on the presumption that Congress always acts rationally when
creating legislation.13 “By presuming that the legislature would not intend
absurd consequences, the court avoids the appearance that it is infringing on
legislative supremacy when it rejects a plain meaning that would result in
absurdity.”14 The other school of thought, textualism, refers to the principle
that statutes should be read with strict literalism, as “only through a system of
interpretation limited to the words of the statute can we hope to have clear and
predictable rules . . . .”15 Nevertheless, textualism does not proceed without
some of the flexibility expressed in intentionalism, as textualists interpret
statutory language “by asking how ‘a skilled, objectively reasonable user of

11. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1948).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1948).
13. Dougherty, supra note 4, at 136–37.
14. Id. The absurdity doctrine, which entails that statutes should be interpreted to avoid absurd
results, will be discussed in Part IV in regard to the likelihood of reaching absurd results when
determining venue if other courts adhere to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Lozoya. See Staszewski,
supra note 7, at 1006.
15. Dougherty, supra note 4, at 133–34.
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words’ would have understood the statutory text.”16 Both of these approaches
to statutory interpretation will be explored within the scope of Lozoya,
particularly in relation to 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).
Recent federal decisions concerning the proper venue for an offense
committed during a cross-county flight have authorized a broader scope in
establishing venue than that landed upon by the Ninth Circuit in 2019. In
United States v. Breitweiser, the Eleventh Circuit held that venue for mid-air
crimes is proper in the district where the airplane lands.17 There, in the wake
of a sexual assault against a minor that occurred over the course of a flight
from Houston to Atlanta, the Eleventh Circuit broadly interpreted § 3237(a)
without inquiring as to what it truly means for an offense to “involve” the use
of transportation.18 According to the court’s reading of the statute, “[t]o
establish venue, the government need only show that the crime took place on
a form of transportation in interstate commerce,” which it accomplished by
demonstrating that the defendant committed the sexual assault on an airplane
that ultimately landed—and consequently established venue—in Atlanta.19
The court opined that “[i]t would be difficult if not impossible for the
government to prove . . . exactly which federal district was beneath the plane
when Breitweiser committed the crimes.”20
In United States v. Cope, the Tenth Circuit clarified what a “continuing
offense” is under § 3237(a), holding that venue for in-flight crimes is proper
in any district through which the plane travels during the flight, including the
district in which it lands.21 There, after navigating a flight from Austin, Texas
to Denver, Colorado, a pilot was charged with operating a common carrier
while under the influence of alcohol.22 The Tenth Circuit found that, as a
result of his intoxication, the pilot had violated 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) and
committed a “continuing offense” by operating transportation in interstate
commerce that began in one district and was completed in another.23
Therefore, the court held that “[v]enue is proper in any district through which
16. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2458. In short, even if a
statutory text does not spell out every detail, textualists interpret that statute “according to the legal
system's accepted procedures, evidentiary rules, burdens of persuasion - and defenses.” Id. at 2469.
17. United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012).
22. Id. at 1222.
23. Id. at 1225.
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[the pilot] traveled on the flight, including the District of Colorado,” the
district in which the flight landed.24
However, in 2019 the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Lozoya
created a circuit split when the court departed from the persuasive authority
of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.25 In response to an assault committed
during a flight, the Ninth Circuit adequately clarified what it means for an
offense to “involve” transportation in interstate commerce, and whether or not
such an offense should be designated as a “continuing offense.”26 The court
held that the only proper venue for a crime committed during an airplane flight
is the district in which the crime took place.27 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling has
given rise to concerns as to whether a court can convincingly ascertain the
locus delicti of the committed offense,28 and therefore whether Lozoya
arbitrarily complicates the task of determining the proper venue for trial.29 At
the same time, the Ninth Circuit’s adherence to a textualist reading of
§ 3237(a), while taking the care to determine the plain meaning of the statute’s
key language, should be lauded as an exercise of proper judicial restraint.30
The court properly refused to implement the kind of intentionalist perspective
of venue provisions that has begun to erode well-established principles in
determining where venue properly lies.31
III.

FACTS OF LOZOYA

On a July 2015 Delta Airlines flight from Minneapolis to Los Angeles,
Monique Lozoya settled into a middle seat in the rear of the plane with her
boyfriend, Joshua Moffie, and another passenger, Charles Goocher, seated on
either side of her.32 Oded Wolff sat directly behind Lozoya, while his wife
Merav occupied the accompanying window seat.33
24. Id.
25. United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 2019).
26. Id. at 1242.
27. Id.
28. United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 279 (1999) (holding that the “’locus
delicti [of the charged offense] must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the
location of the act or acts constituting it.’” (quoting United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703
(1946))).
29. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1244–45.
30. Id. at 1243.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1233.
33. Id.
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Lozoya’s efforts to sleep during the flight were interrupted as Wolff
repeatedly contacted her seat, an account confirmed by Goocher. 34 Later in
the flight, when Wolff and his wife left to use the restroom, Lozoya told
Moffie that she would address the disturbance with Wolff when he came back
to his seat.35 A turbulent exchange ensued upon Wolff’s return, as Lozoya
claimed Wolff took exception to her request that he stop hitting her seat and
moved his hand uncomfortably near to her face.36 Lozoya testified that fear
and nerves provoked her to push Wolff’s face away with an open palm,
thereby causing his nose to bleed.37 Flight attendants then defused the
altercation and questioned the parties.38 Wolff acknowledged that he would
meet with Lozoya at the airport following the flight and consider accepting an
apology after hearing her perspective on the incident; nevertheless, Lozoya
opted against meeting with Wolff, and left the airport without apologizing. 39
After being issued a violation notice charging her with assault in August
2015, Lozoya was formally charged with a Class A misdemeanor for assault
in February 2016, which was later adjusted to a Class B misdemeanor for
simple assault in April 2016.40 At the bench trial, Lozoya moved for acquittal
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 for improper venue in the
Central District of California.41 The magistrate judge held that venue was
proper under 18 U.S.C. § 7(a), finding that “to establish venue, the
government only needs to prove that the crime took place on a form of
transportation in interstate commerce.”42 The court ultimately found Lozoya
guilty of simple assault.43 On appeal to the United States District Court for
the Central District of California under the same claims, Lozoya’s conviction
was affirmed, and an appeal to the Ninth Circuit followed.44

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE LOZOYA OPINION

A. Judge Smith’s Opinion
The Ninth Circuit reached the correct holding in United States v. Lozoya
because its decision to confront—rather than avoid—the risk of reaching
absurd results during venue determinations for offenses involving travel in
interstate commerce faithfully adhered to the plain meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3237(a).
1. The Inapplicability and Preclusion of the First Paragraph of 18
U.S.C. § 3238
In brief, the Ninth Circuit was wise to give little attention to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3238 and dismiss its pertinence to the facts of Lozoya.45 Application of 18
U.S.C. § 3238 requires that the charged offense was “begun or committed” in
international waters or any other location outside of the jurisdiction of any
specific U.S. state or district.46 Judge Smith was straightforward in his
discussion on § 3238: “Here, the assault occurred entirely within the
jurisdiction of a particular district. It neither began nor was committed
entirely outside the United States, and so § 3238 is inapplicable.”47
2. The Superiority of a Textualist Reading of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)
The crux of the disagreement between Judge Smith’s majority opinion
and Judge Owens’s dissenting opinion concerning the applicability of 18
U.S.C. § 3237(a) to the facts of Lozoya rests upon distinct interpretations of
two key clauses contained within the statute: what constitutes an offense
“involving the use of . . . transportation in interstate or foreign commerce”
and, consequently, how this determination gives effect to the understanding
of a “continuing offense.”48
As previously mentioned, textualism in statutory interpretation subscribes
45. Id. at 1241.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1948); see also O’Neill, supra note 2, at 1429.
47. Compare United States v. Lozoya, 920 F.3d 1231, 1241, (9th Cir. 2019), with United States v.
Walczak, 783 F.2d 852, 855 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3238 permitted venue in the
district in which the offender was first brought because his offense had been committed “out of the
jurisdiction of any particular state or district”).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1948).
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to the notion that statutes should be read with strict literalism and give
precedence to the common, reasonable understanding of the words contained
in the statute’s text.49 Meanwhile, intentionalism in statutory interpretation
emphasizes the presumption that a rational governing body such as Congress
would not enact legislation with the intent of creating absurd results, and
therefore courts are justified in rejecting the plain meaning of a statute and
imparting the supposed sensible intentions of Congress to avoid the absurd
results that would stem from a rigid, literal reading of the same statute. 50
Where the circuit courts in Breitweiser and Cope used an intentionalist
reading of § 3237(a) that entailed an admirable, although subjective, effort to
implement Congress’s intent to supply a means of efficiently determining
venue for crimes committed during flight,51 both decisions strayed from the
sensible, superior textualist reading of § 3237(a) used by the Ninth Circuit in
Lozoya. An offense genuinely “involving the use of . . . transportation in
interstate or foreign commerce” goes beyond an incidental relationship
between the crime and the fact that transportation is present at the time of the
crime’s commission.52 This phrase does not boil down to a crime’s
coincidence with transportation in interstate commerce to implicate any given
offense that took place on a form of transportation in interstate commerce.
Instead, as Lozoya demonstrates, the offense is not always so inextricably
bound to the use of transportation in interstate commerce so as to make it a
“continuing offense” by definition under § 3237(a).53
Indeed, the
transportation—the flight—in Lozoya was not at all requisite to the
advancement or completion of the assault. In fact, it was in no way
contemplated as a means of successfully facilitating the crime, nor was the
flight “involved” as a quintessential condition or circumstance of the crime. 54
Moreover, an exploration of the fundamental purpose of § 3237(a)
49. Manning, supra note 16, at 2390–91.
50. Id. at 2389–90.
51. See United States v. Breitweiser, 357 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cope,
676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012).
52. Compare Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1240, with Breitweiser, 357 F.3d at 1253. But see Cope, 676
F.3d at 1225 (finding venue to be proper in multiple districts because the defendant, a pilot, flew a
plane under the influence of alcohol across multiple districts). Unlike Lozoya, Cope involved an
offense that legitimately implicated “transportation in interstate commerce.” Id. Lozoya’s assault was
not an offense truly “involving the use of . . . transportation in interstate commerce” in the same
manner as Cope because the occurrence of an assault on an airplane does not jeopardize the stability
of air travel the same way the impairment of a pilot would.
53. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1240.
54. Id.
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effectively reveals how the phrase “involving” relates to the relationship
between the transportation and the crime. Section 3237(a) was designed to
“prevent a crime which has been committed in transit from escaping
punishment” for lack of ascertainable venue.55 As such, it was not created to
exert control over venue for crimes implicating transportation in interstate
commerce for the sake of interstate commerce itself, but to prevent the fraying
of justice for crimes that elude traditional means of pinpointing the
commission of the crime for purposes of determining proper venue.56
Section 3237(a) sets forth in broad strokes an ambitious vision for
ascertaining venue, but it is not a statute that merits gap-filling when the facts
of a given situation do not coincide with the plain meaning of the statute’s
text.57 Broad standards for determining venue are not unconstitutional so long
as courts take caution to properly establish parameters to the statute’s
application.58 The commonly understood meaning of “involving” provides
the proper parameters in this case.
A secondary consequence of Judge Smith’s reinterpretation of what
“involving” means within the scope of § 3237(a) was the limitation placed on
the statute’s representation of a “continuing offense,” as well as the statute’s
reach in providing venue across multiple districts.59 According to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3237(a), a “continuing offense” is defined as one “begun in one district and
completed in another, or committed in more than one district,” whereas a noncontinuing offense would be one begun and committed in a single district, and
therefore limited solely to the jurisdiction of that district. 60 Upon the given
facts, Lozoya began and completed the assault rather instantaneously.61
Because there was no pause between the initiation, commission, and
completion of the offense, it is likely that the assault began and terminated in
the same single district. In other words, there was no continuation of the
offense into another district so as to attach to the assault the label of a
“continuing offense” under which § 3237(a) would properly apply.62 Instead,
55. United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 350 (11th Cir. 1982).
56. Id.
57. See O’Neill, supra note 2, at 1447.
58. See Staszewski, supra note 7, at 1056.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1948).
60. Id.
61. Lozoya v. United States, 920 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 2019).
62. See United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding venue to be proper
in multiple districts because the defendant, a pilot, flew a plane under the influence of alcohol across
multiple districts). As Judge Smith noted, “[o]nce the assault had concluded, any subsequent activity
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Lozoya’s assault was a “point-in-time” offense, committed and terminated
prior to crossing into the airspace of the Central District of California.63
Consequently, as Judge Smith discerned, the Central District was not the
proper venue for Lozoya’s trial.
B. Judge Owens’s Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent
In contrast to Judge Smith’s textualist take on 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)’s
applicability to the venue issue in Lozoya, Judge Owens’s dissent took a
traditional intentionalist stance when interpreting the statute’s relationship to
the case.64 While conceding that 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) is not without
ambiguity, he recognized the challenge posed by a stipulation to determine
the locus delicti of the charged offense before venue may be established, as
“[i]n this age of jet aircraft a moment of time can mean many miles have been
traversed.”65 He argued for an intentionalist perspective on § 3237(a),
invoking the practicality of the absurdity doctrine because the legislature
could not have reasonably intended for the prosecution to “pinpoint the
precise minute” when a criminal offense occurred mid-flight in order to
properly establish venue.66
C. Assessing The Risk of Absurdity Resulting From Application of the
Majority’s Holding
The decisions of Judge Smith and Judge Owens come to a head upon
consideration of the likelihood of reaching absurd results through the
application of the majority’s literal interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). The
absurdity doctrine submits that “if a particular application of a clear statute
produces an absurd result, the Court understands itself to be a more faithful
agent if it adjusts the statute to reflect what Congress would have intended

was incidental and therefore irrelevant for venue purposes.” Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1239.
63. But cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 281 (1999) (holding that “[w]here a
crime consists of distinct parts which have different localities the whole may be tried where any part
can be proved to have been done.” (quoting United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 (1916))); United
States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 910–11 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that essential conduct elements were
committed in multiple districts so as to properly permit venue in each of the given districts).
64. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1244–45.
65. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 87-694, at 2–3 (1961)).
66. Id.
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had it confronted the putative absurdity.”67
While Judge Smith is aware of a “creeping absurdity” resulting from a
decision requiring prosecutors to “pinpoint” the location above which an inflight offense occurred so as to properly prove venue in that district, he takes
a textualist stance in insisting that the court “cannot ignore the binding effect
of precedent and the Constitution.”68 He does not waver from the force of
these sources of law in suggesting that Congress might “enact a new statute
to remedy any irrationality that might follow from our conclusion.”69 Judge
Owens posits that “limiting venue to a ‘flyover state’” would be irrational and
untenable for the efficiency of the legal system, because “[u]nder the
majority’s rule, the government must prove which district—not merely which
state—an airplane was flying over when the crime was committed.”70
However, Judge Owens fails to account for the complex technology
embedded in planes and the firmly-established procedures for recording flight
data that can be comprehensibly distilled for accurate determinations of
venue. It is important to articulate that Judge Smith’s textualist interpretation
of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) is not incompatible with the absurdity doctrine—the
principle simply does not apply when the prospect of generating absurd results
is so speculative.71 History suggests that, “even if one rejected a free-floating
absurdity doctrine, one could expect the judiciary’s enforcement of
constitutional values to address many putative injustices that, in a system of
unqualified legislative supremacy, might compel resort to principles of
absurdity.”72
V.

IMPACT & CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit was correct to depart from the holdings of the Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits for failure of those courts’ intentionalist interpretation
of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) to encompass the factual distinctions of Lozoya. The
Ninth Circuit’s holding bridges the gap between constitutional norms that
formed the bedrock of venue determination procedures and a recent trend
67. Manning, supra note 16, at 2394.
68. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1243.
69. Id. This very recommendation contradicts the opinion that “the absence of such a doctrine
might compel Congress to legislate at an excessive level of detail, thereby raising the procedural costs
of bargaining over legislation.” Manning, supra note 16, at 2438.
70. Id. at 1244–45.
71. See Dougherty, supra note 4, at 159.
72. Manning, supra note 16, at 2393.
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towards permitting venue based on unrefined standards of what constitutes a
“continuing offense” or an offense “involving the use of . . . transportation in
interstate commerce.” The Lozoya decision is especially significant because
it confronted circumstances that did not easily lend to precedential definitions
of such terms, and therefore exercised statutory interpretation that was faithful
to well-settled traditions of venue law without heeding to the accessible but
superficial understanding of § 3237(a) that has recently guided courts.73
This is not to say that challenges will not arise from this decision;
nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Lozoya was a demonstration of the
court putting its foot down on a pattern of overinclusive statutory
interpretation threatening to disturb the balance of power between the
legislature and the judiciary. Concerns of reaching absurd results under the
Ninth Circuit’s decision, while not entirely impractical, are outweighed by the
advancements in statutory interpretation made during the court’s deliberation.
“[A]bsurdity, being apparently more a common-sense concept than a legal
one, is arguably no more within the special knowledge and training of the
legal community than it is within the common knowledge and instinct of the
community at large.”74 The Ninth Circuit was prudent to prioritize and
embrace common sense in reaching a decision in accord with society’s
common understanding of the relationship between a crime and the tangential
circumstance of transportation in interstate commerce. Instead of stepping on
the toes of Congress based upon a presumption of its legislative intent, the
Ninth Circuit shrewdly left the door open to Congress to readdress and refine
statutes such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3237(a) and 3238 to satisfactorily provide venue
for the complex reality of in-flight criminal activities.

Zachary Remijas

73. Lozoya, 920 F.3d at 1239–41.
74. Dougherty, supra note 4, at 163.
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